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Abstract
Transreal numbers provide a total semantics containing classical truth values,
dialetheaic, fuzzy and gap values. A paraconsistent Sheffer Stroke generalises all
classical logics to a paraconsistent form. We introduce logical spaces of all possi-
ble worlds and all propositions. We operate on a proposition, in all possible worlds,
at the same time. We define logical transformations, possibility and necessity rela-
tions, in proposition space, and give a criterion to determine whether a proposition
is classical. We show that proofs, based on the conditional, infer gaps only from
gaps and that negative and positive infinity operate as bottom and top values.
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1 Introduction
We rehearse our development of total semantics [8] by considering paraconsistent
logics. These were explicitly introduced in the second half of the twentieth cen-
tury as non-classical logics that can reason about inconsistent axioms [12][21]. In
a classical logic, inconsistent axioms explode, allowing any theorem to be proved
in a trivial way [18][11]. Paraconsistent logics do not explode, they allow only lim-
ited conclusions to be drawn from inconsistent axioms. Some admit dialetheias,
that is propositions that are both False and True [20], and some admit Gap values
with no degree of falsity or truthfulness [23]. Gap values are usually treated ab-
sorptively so that any logical combination with a Gap produces a Gap as result.
This behaviour is consistent with one reading [17] of Frege’s principle of compo-
sitionallity so that a compound proposition lacks reference if any component of
it lacks reference. It should be added that paraconsistent logics are also capable
of classical reasoning so they provide a robust generalisation of classical logic.
1
This makes them interesting both from a theoretical and a practical perspective
[10][21][28].
Paraconsistent logics are often formalised in advanced mathematics [12][23][24].
We take the simpler approach of expressing them arithmetically. We use transreal
arithmetic, which is a generalisation of real arithmetic. Transreal arithmetic was
originally developed [1][2] from a subset of the algorithms used in the arithmetic
of fractions. It has been axiomatised and a machine proof of consistency has been
given [7]. A human proof of consistency is given in [13]. The algorithms of tran-
sreal arithmetic are explained, particularly clearly, in a tutorial in [4].
In Section 2 we generalise all classical logics to a paraconsistent form by ex-
pressing the Sheffer Stroke [9] in transreal arithmetic. In Section 3 we introduce
a logical space in which we operate on a proposition in all possible worlds at the
same time. The idea of logical space is inspired by Wittgenstein’s conception that
the world’s logical form is given by a picture that is a “configuration of objects.”
See [26][27] sections 2, 3 and, especially 3.4. Thus, just as physical objects are ar-
ranged in physical space, so logical objects are arranged in a “logical space” [15].
Wittgenstein did not define precisely his notion of logical space. However, by fol-
lowing the intuitive idea that the elements of this space are propositions and the
interactions between them are connectives, we establish a logical space as a well-
defined mathematical structure, something like a vector space, where the proposi-
tions are “vectors” and the connectives are “vector” transformations. In this space
we give a mathematical sense to the notion of logical transformation and of pos-
sibility and necessity relations. The mathematical treatment ends by establishing
a criterion for determining whether a proposition is or is not classical in a given
possible world.
2 Paraconsistent Logic
We use the entire set of transreal numbers to supply the semantic values, that is the
truth values, of paraconsistent logic. In this section we exploit the intuition that
a conclusion departs no further from being equally false and true than the most
extreme of its antecedents. This is sufficient to make a logic non-explosive. We
define a paraconsistent version of the Sheffer Stroke via the minimum value of its
antecedents. This paraconsistent operator may be used to generalise all classical
logics to a paraconsistent form.
2.1 Truth Values
The transreal numbers are just the real numbers augmented with three non-finite
numbers: negative infinity (−∞), positive infinity (∞) and nullity (Φ). Nullity is
absorptive over the elementary arithmetical operations so that when it is involved
in a sum, difference, product or quotient, the result is nullity. However nullity is
not universally absorptive, it may be an element of arbitrary mappings. Nullity
is the only unordered number in transreal arithmetic [7][6]. Nullity’s absorptive
properties make it a good candidate for a Gap value that has no degree of falsity or
truthfulness [25][8]. We define that negative infinity is classical False and positive
infinity is classical True. This has the merit that we have now used up all of the
non-finite, transreal numbers, leaving all of the real numbers to convey dialetheaic
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degrees of falsity and truthfulness. Here we use arithmetical negation (unary sub-
traction) to model logical negation. Alternative encodings are discussed in [16][8].
Returning now to our paraconsistent logic, we define that the real numbers en-
code degrees of both falsity and truthfulness. The negative real numbers are more
False than True, the positive, real numbers are more True than False, zero is equally
False and True. We relate the degree of falsity and truthfulness monotonically to
the number modelling the truth value so that negative infinity is entirely False, that
is classically False, and positive infinity is entirely True, that is classically True.
2.2 Sheffer Stroke
It is known that the truth functional (Boolean) operators for logical negation (not,
¬), logical conjunction (and, &), and logical disjunction (or, ∨) are functionally
complete [9] (See entry “Sheffer Stroke” ), [22] (p. 29) so that any truth func-
tional operators can be derived from these three. In fact it is known that the sets
{¬,&} and {¬,∨} are each functionally complete but it serves our purpose bet-
ter to consider the wider set of operators {¬,&,∨}. We use the transreal minimum
and maximum functions to define paraconsistent versions of the classical negation,
conjunction and disjunction operators. We use negative infinity (−∞) to model
classical False (F) and positive infinity (∞) to model classical True (T). We use
nullity (Φ) to model the logical Gap value (G). Note that only the real numbers
model dialetheaic truth values. The three non-finite numbers each model a single
truth value. We then prove that the paraconsistent operators contain the classical
ones. With a little extra work we prove that the paraconsistent operators are well
defined for all transreal arguments when we assume that the finite, truth values are
arranged monotonically with the real numbers that model them. We then define a
paraconsistent version of the Sheffer Stroke (|). There are three, well known, iden-
tities that relate the classical Sheffer Stroke to classical negation, conjunction and
disjunction. We show that these identities hold when we substitute the paraconsis-
tent Sheffer Stroke and the paraconsistent negation, conjunction and disjunction.
Thus we prove that the paraconsistent operators are defined everywhere and are
consistent with their classical counterparts.
We begin by defining the binary, transreal, minimum and maximum functions
so that the minimum of two transreal numbers is the least, ordered one of them
or else is nullity. Similarly the maximum of two transreal numbers is the greatest,
ordered one of them or else is nullity. These definitions rely on the three tran-
sreal relations less-than, equal-to, greater-than as axiomatised in [7], explicated in
[5] and corrected in [14]. It is sufficient for the reader to know that: nullity is
the uniquely unordered, transreal number so it is the only transreal number that
compares not-less-than, not-equal-to and not-greater than any other distinct num-
ber; negative infinity is the least, ordered, transreal number; positive infinity is the
greatest, ordered, transreal number.
Definition 1 Transreal minimum,
min(a,b) =

a : a < b
a : a = b
a : b =Φ
b : b < a
b : a =Φ
.
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Definition 2 Transreal maximum,
max(a,b) =

a : a > b
a : a = b
a : b =Φ
b : b > a
b : a =Φ
.
The minimum and maximum functions, just defined, treat nullity non-absorptively
but we chose to treat the logical Gap value absorptively.
Definition 3 Paraconsistent conjunction,
a & b =
{
Φ : a =Φ or b =Φ
min(a,b) : otherwise
.
Definition 4 Paraconsistent disjunction,
a ∨ b =
{
Φ : a =Φ or b =Φ
max(a,b) : otherwise
.
We now define the paraconsistent, logical negation as transarithmetical nega-
tion.
Definition 5 Paraconsistent negation, ¬a =−a.
Transreal arithmetic has −0 = 0, −Φ = Φ and in all other cases, the negation
is distinct so that −a 6= a.
The Sheffer Stroke (|) may be defined as an infix operator but we follow the
more modern practice of taking it as a post-fix operator so that no bracketing is
needed. This leads to shorter and clearer formulas.
Definition 6 Paraconsistent Sheffer Stroke, ab|= ¬(a & b), with all symbols read
paraconsistently.
We now prove that the paraconsistent negation, conjunction and disjunction
contain their classical counterparts and that the paraconsistent operators are well
defined for all transreal arguments.
Theorem 1 Paraconsistent negation contains classical negation.
Proof 1 Classical negation has ¬F = T and ¬T = F. Equivalently paraconsistent
negation has ¬(−∞) =−(−∞) = ∞ and ¬∞=−∞.
Theorem 2 Paraconsistent conjunction contains classical conjunction.
Proof 2 Classical conjunction has F & F = F; F & T = F; T & F = F; T & T =
T. Equivalently paraconsistent conjunction has −∞ & −∞ = min(−∞,−∞) =
−∞; −∞ & ∞ = min(−∞,∞) = −∞; ∞ & −∞ = min(∞,−∞) = −∞; ∞ & ∞ =
min(∞,∞) = ∞.
Theorem 3 Paraconsistent disjunction contains classical disjunction.
Proof 3 Classical disjunction has F ∨ F = F; F ∨ T = T; T ∨ F = T; T ∨ T =
T. Equivalently paraconsistent disjunction has −∞ ∨ −∞ = max(−∞,−∞) =
−∞; −∞ ∨ ∞ = max(−∞,∞) = ∞; ∞ ∨ −∞ = max(∞,−∞) = ∞; ∞ ∨ ∞ =
max(∞,∞) = ∞.
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Theorem 4 Paraconsistent negation, conjunction, and disjunction are well de-
fined for all transreal arguments.
Proof 4 Paraconsistent negation, conjunction, and disjunction are defined for all
transreal arguments. It remains only to show that these operators are monotonic.
Firstly nullity is absorptive in these operators so that if any argument is nullity
the result is nullity. Nullity is disjoint from all other transreal numbers because it
is the uniquely isolated point of transreal space [6], therefore nullity results are
disjoint from all other transreal results and cannot contradict them. Secondly the
preceding three theorems show that the paraconsistent operators are well defined
at the boundaries −∞ and ∞ but, by definition, the non-nullity, paraconsistent,
truth values are monotonic so the operators just defined are monotonic for all
transreal t in the range −∞ ≤ t ≤ ∞. This completes the proof for all transreal
arguments.
We now derive the paraconsistent negation, conjunction and disjunction from
formulas involving the paraconsistent Sheffer Stroke. This proves that the para-
consistent Sheffer Stroke is functionally complete both for classical truth values
and for the paraconsistent truth values defined here.
Theorem 5 pp|= ¬p for all transreal p.
Proof 5 pp|= ¬(p & p) = ¬p, with all symbols read paraconsistently.
Theorem 6 pq|pq||= p & q for all transreal p,q.
Proof 6 pq|pq|| = (¬(p & q))(¬(p & q))| = ¬(¬(p & q)) = p & q, with all
symbols read paraconsistently.
Theorem 7 pp|qq||= p ∨ q for all transreal p,q.
Proof 7 pp|qq|| = (¬p) (¬q) | = ¬((¬p) & (¬q)) = p∨ q by the classical de
Morgan’s Law, generalised to all transreal numbers by monotonicity and the ab-
sorptiveness of nullity, with all symbols read paraconsistently.
3 Proposition Space
We define logical space, very generally, as a scalar space whose axes are logical
elements and whose scalar values are semantic values. This allows us to apply
many mathematical methods to logic. We begin with an orthogonal co-ordinate
frame where each axis is a copy of the transreal number line. This gives us a
trans-Cartesian co-ordinate frame. The more abstract Proposition space has each
possible world as an axis and each point is a proposition whose co-ordinates are
the semantic values of that proposition in each possible world. This allows us to
apply mathematical and logical operations, simultaneously, to propositions in all
possible worlds.
We define logical transformations, very generally, as a transformations in log-
ical space. In Section 2, above, we use a paraconsistent Sheffer Stroke. This
transformation can be summarised by the side condition that its conclusion departs
no further from being equally False and True than its antecedents. We now use a
generalisation of the classical conditional which has the property that its conclu-
sion is at least as true as its antecedents. We say that a proposition, or other point,
p, is derived from a proposition, or other point, q, if and only if there is a chain of
logical transformations that maps q onto p. In particular the chain of conditionals
is a proof path.
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Figure 1: Possible worlds are vectors with a co-ordinate in each proposition. Here
u = (F,T ), v = (F,F), w = (T,T ), z = (T,F) are vectors.
3.1 Transreal Functions of All Propositions
We will define atomic propositions as objects in our transreal model. However, to
begin, we assume that the set of atomic propositions is a countable set. Hence the
set of atomic propositions can be written in the form {P1,P2,P3, . . .}, where Pi 6=Pj
whenever i 6= j. Note that we are not defining the set of atomic propositions yet.
This is just a representation of the set to be defined.
A possible world is a binding of the atomic propositions to its semantic val-
ues. That is, at a given possible world, each atomic proposition takes on a se-
mantic value in RT . Thus we can interpret a possible world as a function from
{P1,P2,P3, . . .} to RT . But this is nothing more than an infinite sequence of el-
ements from RT . In this way, every possible world is an element from (RT )N.
Conversely every element from (RT )N is a possible world.
To facilitate understanding of possible worlds let us introduce a simplified
model with just two semantic values F and T and just two atomic propositions
P1 and P2. An example of a possible world is the world where the atomic propo-
sition P1 has semantic value F and the atomic proposition P2 has semantic value
T . Another example is the world where both the atomic propositions P1,P2 have
semantic value F . The first world can be represented by the pair (F,T ) and the sec-
ond world by the pair (F,F), where the first co-ordinate of the pair represents the
semantic value of the proposition P1 and the second co-ordinate represents the se-
mantic value of the proposition P2. In this simplified model there are four possible
worlds: (F,T ), (F,F), (T,T ) and (T,F). These pairs can be viewed geometrically
as “vectors:”
Returning to our transreal model, possible worlds are also “vectors” but with
infinitely many co-ordinates, not just two, and these co-ordinates take values inRT
not in {F,T}. Possible worlds are points in (RT )N whose axes are atomic propo-
sitions and whose co-ordinates are the semantic value of the underlying atomic
proposition in that possible world. Given a possible world w = (wi)i∈N ∈ (RT )N,
we have that wi corresponds to the semantic value of Pi in w, for each i ∈ N.
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We now define atomic propositions in our simplified model, before generalis-






















The generic table associates propositions with worlds. A possible world is a
row of the table which gives the semantic values of successive propositions. An
atomic proposition is uniquely determined by its semantic values in all possible
worlds. That is, if we know the semantic values of an atomic proposition in each
possible world, we know this atomic proposition. In other words, an atomic propo-
sition is completely determined by a column of the table. Thus P1 = (F,F,T,T )
and P2 = (T,F,T,F). Here the atomic propositions are 4−tuples, which is to say
they are “vectors” of four co-ordinates. Of course we cannot have a picture of
the atomic propositions as vectors, because this figure would be in four dimen-
sions, but we can draw the projections in three dimensions, ignoring the fourth
co-ordinate. Thus the projections of P1 and P2, in three dimensions, are (F,F,T )
and (T,F,T ). Pictorially:
Figure 2: Atomic propositions are vectors with a co-ordinate in each possible world.
Here the projections P1 = (F,F,T ) and P2 = (T,F,T ) are vectors.
We now extend the simplified model to the transreal model. For each i ∈N, let





i ∈ N, notice that for each possible world w = (w j) j∈N, we interpret pi(w) as the
semantic value of the i-th atomic proposition, Pi, in the possible world w. Hence
for each i ∈ N, (pi(w))w∈(RT )N is an (RT )N-tuple which expresses the semantic
value of the atomic proposition Pi in all possible worlds. In this way, each atomic




w∈(RT )N . This motivates the following
definition.
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w∈(RT )N , . . .
}
.
We call each element fromP an atomic proposition, henceP is the set of atomic
propositions.











w∈(RT )N , . . .
are pairwise distinct. Indeed for each i, j ∈ N, such that i 6= j, there is u ∈ (RT )N








w∈(RT )N whenever i 6= j.
By Definition 7, each atomic proposition is a point within the space (RT )(RT )N ,
the set of the functions whose domain is the space of sequences of transreal num-
bers and whose counter-domain is the set of transreal numbers. Further, for each
i∈N, (pi(w))w∈(RT )N corresponds to i-th atomic proposition, that is, (pi(w))w∈(RT )N
corresponds to Pi. And, for each w ∈ (RT )N, pi(w) corresponds to the semantic
value of Pi in the possible world w.
Definition 8 Let ¬ : (RT )(RT )N −→ (RT )(RT )N ,
¬(pw)w∈(RT )N = (¬pw)w∈(RT )N , (1)
∨ : (RT )(RT )N × (RT )(RT )N −→ (RT )(RT )N





and & : (RT )(RT )N × (RT )(RT )N −→ (RT )(RT )N




w∈(RT )N . (3)
We abuse notation, above, but the reader will perceive that, in (1), the symbol
¬, on the left hand side of the equality, refers to a function which is being defined
on (RT )(RT )N , while the symbol ¬, on the right hand side of the equality, refers to
a function already defined on RT . Similarly for ∨ in (2) and for & in (3).
Definition 9 Let A ⊂ (RT )(RT )N and let LA be defined as the class of all sets
XA ⊂ (RT )(RT )N , where XA has the following properties:
i) A⊂ XA and




XA. Let p ∈ (RT )(RT )N then we say that p is a logical com-
bination of elements from A if and only if p ∈ LA. Given B ⊂ (RT )(RT )N , we say
that B is a logically independent set, if and only if, for all p ∈ B, p is not a logical
combination of elements from B\{p}.
Proposition 1 The setP is logically independent.
Proof 8 SupposeP is not logically independent. This means there is an element
fromP which is a logical combination of some other elements fromP . Without



























w∈(RT )N is the result of a determinate composition, T , between the func-
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p j1(w), p j2(w), . . . , p jm(w)
)
for all w ∈ (RT )N. (4)
Let arbitrary (u1,u2, . . .)∈ (RT )N, u′ 6= T (u j1 ,u j2 , . . . ,u jm), v= (v1,v2,v3 . . .) :=
(u′,u2,u3, . . .). We have v ∈ (RT )N and v1 6= T (v j1 ,v j2 , . . . ,v jm). Hence p1(v) 6=
T
(
p j1(v), p j2(v), . . . , p jm(v)
)
. This contradicts (4). HenceP is logically indepen-
dent.
Remark 1 Proposition 1 justifies us in calling the propositions inP atomic.
Definition 10 Let Π := LP , that is,
Π=
{
q ∈ (RT )(RT )N ; q is logical combination of elements fromP}.
We call Π a proposition space and each element from Π a proposition.
Proposition 2 The set Π is countable.
Proof 9 Each element from Π can be written as a finite sequence of symbols from
S :=P∪{¬,∨,&,(,)}. Hence an element from Π can be seen as an element from
Sn for some n ∈N. Thus Π can be seen as a subset of
⋃
n∈N
Sn. Since S is countable,⋃
n∈N
Sn is countable, whence Π is countable.
Corollary 1 Proposition space, Π, is a proper subset of (RT )(RT )N . Thus Π is
different to (RT )(RT )N .
Proof 10 Denote the cardinality of a set S by |S| and let c be the cardinality of
the continuum. Note that, using Cantor’s transfinite arithmetic, |Π| = ℵ0 but∣∣∣(RT )(RT )N ∣∣∣= c(cℵ0 )= cc= (2ℵ0)c= 2ℵ0×c= 2c >ℵ0. Hence |Π|< ∣∣∣(RT )(RT )N ∣∣∣
whence Π 6= (RT )(RT )N .
Remark 2 Notice that every proposition, in the ordinary sense, lies in Π but Π is
within the bigger set (RT )(RT )N . Hence there are points from (RT )(RT )N that are
not logical combinations of atomic propositions. These points are not expressible
in any language but this does not require that they are meaningless. This issue
is taken up in Section 4. We call the whole space, (RT )(RT )N , hyper-proposition
space.
Remark 3 We emphasise that in our transreal model there are three distinct sets
of propositions:
• P is the set of all atomic propositions.
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• Π, called proposition space, is the set of all propositions (atomic or molecu-
lar).
• (RT )(RT )N , called hyper-proposition space, is the whole set of all function
whose domain is the space of sequences of transreal numbers and whose
counter-domain is the set of transreal numbers.
We have the proper inclusion: P (Π( (RT )(RT )N .
Definition 11 We say that a proposition (pw)w∈(RT )N ∈Π is necessary in a possi-
ble world u if and only if pw > 0 for all w ∈ (RT )N, such that u accesses w. And
we say that (pw)w∈(RT )N ∈ Π is possible in a possible world u if and only if there
is a w ∈ (RT )N such that u accesses w and pw > 0. A world u accesses a world w
if and only if there is a linear transformation on (RT )N that maps u onto w.
3.2 Logical Transformations
In classical logic the connective conditional,→, is defined as follows [19]:
→: {F,T}×{F,T} −→ {F,T}
F → F = T , F → T = T
T → F = F , T → T = T
.
This means that:
i) if the antecedent is false then the conditional is true, regardless of the value
of the consequent and
ii) if the consequent is true then the conditional is true, regardless of the value
of the antecedent.
In non-classical logics, the conditional is defined in various ways. However, the
above observation gives us the familiar intuition that the conditional is true if and
only if the degree of truth of the consequent is greater than or equal to the degree
of truth of the antecedent. Motivated by this, we propose the following definition.









. We call T a logical transforma-
tion if and only if pw ≤ T (pw) for all w ∈ (RT )N.
It is well known that, in classical, propositional calculus, one can derive any
proposition from bottom [18][11], ⊥, that is:
for all p within the system, ⊥ ` p. (5)
Consider Γ :=
{
(pw)w∈(RT )N ∈Π; pw ∈ {−∞,∞}
}
.
In Γ, the meta-theorem in (5) is equivalent to an affirmative answer to the
question: is there any point in Γ from which we can derive, by means of a logical
transformation, any point in Γ? One such point is (−∞)w∈(RT )N . That is, for all





In an analogous way we can read the meta-theorem: one can derive top, >,
from any proposition, as: for all p within the system, p ` >. Now (∞)w∈(RT )N is
a point which can be derived from any other point, that is: or all p ∈ Γ, there is a
logical transformation T such that T (p) = (∞)w∈(RT )N .
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If we consider a propositional calculus in which one allows continuous de-
grees of truth and falseness, and, furthermore, propositions that can be both true
and false then the“bottom-point” still is the point from where every point can be
reached and the “top-point” still is the point to which every point can derive.
The verification of this is analogous to the classical case but now we consider
Σ :=
{
(pw)w∈(RT )N ∈Π; pw ∈ [−∞,∞]
}
instead of Γ. And so, for all p ∈ Σ, there




= p and for all p ∈ Σ,
there is a logical transformation T such that T (p) = (∞)w∈(RT )N .
If we extend propositional calculus to Π then the “bottom-point” is no longer
the “privileged place” from which we can derive any point ofΠ. Let q=(qw)w∈(RT )N ∈
Π such that, for some u ∈ (RT )N, qu = Φ. The u-th co-ordinate of the “bottom-
point” is −∞ and, since −∞ ≤ Φ does not hold then we can not derive q from
(−∞)w∈(RT )N by a logical transformation. Thus q is an inaccessible point of Π by
means of a logical transformation that has as initial points those whose co-ordinates
belong to [−∞,∞]. Points like q, that have Φ as the value of some co-ordinate, are
only derivable from points whose corresponding co-ordinate is also Φ.
3.3 A criterion to distinguish classical and non-classical
propositions
Since a proposition is a point in proposition space and since an axis, u, of this
space is a possible world, if a proposition behaves classically, its numerical value
at u is −∞ (classical false) or ∞ (classical true). Hence its contradictory is a point
in the proposition space that has u-co-ordinate ¬(−∞) = ∞ or ¬(∞) = −∞. Thus
if, in a given possible world u, a proposition is classical then the absolute dif-
ference between the u-co-ordinates of the proposition and of its contradictory is
|(−∞)− (∞)| or |∞− (−∞)|, whichever case holds |(−∞)− (∞)|= |∞− (−∞)|=
∞. Conversely if the absolute difference between the u-co-ordinates of a propo-
sition p = (pw)w∈(RT )N and of its contradictory is ∞ then ∞ = |pu − (¬pu)| =
|pu − (−pu)| = 2|pu| whence pu = −∞ or pu = ∞. Hence p is classical in the
possible world u. This demonstrates the following proposition.
Proposition 3 Let p = (pw)w∈(RT )N ∈Π and (qw)w∈(RT )N = ¬p. The proposition
p is classical in the possible world u ∈ (RT )N if and only if |pu−qu|= ∞.
Thus in our proposition space, which instantiates a total semantics, we stipulate
a criterion to distinguish classical from non-classical propositions. Usually there
is no way to distinguish atomic propositions because they have no inner struc-
ture and, therefore, no feature that can be used as a criterion for the distinction,
which is taken arbitrarily. But, as propositions are points located at co-ordinates
in proposition space, atomic propositions are elements of a structured space and
this structure offers a criterion for distinguishing classical and non-classical atomic
propositions.
4 Discussion
Proposition space, Π, is a geometrical version of the usual propositional calculus.
It has all the expected, logical properties of paraconsistent, propositional calculi
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and offers a classical structure when it operates on positive and negative infinity,
which represent the classical truth values, False and True respectively.
Proposition space, Π, is a small part of the entire hyper-proposition space,
(RT )(RT )N . The cardinality of the former is ℵ0; the cardinality of the latter is
greater than the cardinality of the continuum. Thus we can infer that there are
proposition points that will never be expressed by logical combinations of atomic
propositions: these points are essentially non-logical, since we understand by “log-
ical” that a point belongs to proposition space. But does this imply that comple-
mentary elements, in hyper-proposition space but outside proposition space, are
meaningless? We think not.
Complementary points represent what is logically inexpressible: they contain
information, since they lie in the entire (RT )(RT )N space, but this information can-
not be accessed through ordinary, logical reasoning, expressed in any language.
Perhaps we should associate, at least some of them, with metaphysical or philo-
sophical statements that cannot be proved by logical apparatus?
On this point let us emphasise the role of logical transformations. In Section
3.2 a logical transformation is defined as a certain transformation in proposition
space. If we extend this definition, by allowing transformations in the entire hyper-
proposition space, then the concept of a continuous proof path appears. Recall that
a proof path is a chain of compositions of logical transformations. If we restrict
ourselves to the enumerable proposition space then a proof path has a finite or
denumerably infinite length but, more generally speaking, a proof path is a geo-
metrical translation of the notion of demonstration that is used in logic: a list of
propositions that start with premises, supposed to be true, and a conclusion that is
true in virtue of the soundness or correctness of the rules of inference. In the entire
hyper-proposition space, this proof path can be continuous. This fact is very signif-
icant: it gives us a geometrical entity, a continuous path, that has logical meaning.
This path must have a non-denumerable infinitude of hidden propositions – let us
call them subatomic propositions. Hence we see the need to expand the notion
of a discrete demonstration to a continuous demonstration in which, between two
proof steps indexed with finite numbers, there is a continuum of steps that cannot
be expressed in language.
A finite simulation (not an emulation) of a machine that operates on a contin-
uum of propositions is given in [3].
5 Conclusion
We develop a model for a total semantics, for possible worlds, for proposition
space and for hyper-proposition space. We define the set of semantic values as
the set of transreal numbers, RT . This is sufficient to model classical truth val-
ues, paraconsistent, fuzzy and gap values. We give a paraconsistent version of the
Sheffer Stroke which is sufficient to extend all classical logics to a paraconsistent
form. We then turn our attention to logical spaces. We define each possible world,
in world space, as a sequence of transreal numbers. We define the set of propo-
sitions, Π, as a certain subset of (RT )(RT )N . That is each proposition is a tuple,
(pw)w∈(RT )N , where each axis is one possible world, w, and each co-ordinate, pw,
of p is the transreal semantic value of p in the possible world w. This allows us to
operate on a proposition in all possible worlds at the same time. We define in Π the
concepts of possibility, necessity and logical transformation and we define a crite-
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rion which distinguishes whether a proposition is or is not classical. A proposition
is classical in a determined, possible world if and only if the absolute difference
between the semantic value of the proposition and its negation, in the underlying
possible world, is infinite. We show that proofs based on the conditional can infer
gap values only from gap values, that the proposition which is classically False
(−∞), in all possible worlds, is a bottom point from which all non-gap proposi-
tions can be derived and that the proposition which is classically True (∞), in all
possible worlds, is a top point entailed by all non-gap propositions. We discuss
the need for continuous versions of logic that capture inferences and proofs in our
very high cardinality hyper-proposition space, (RT )(RT )N .
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